STRIDE and Other Methodologies, 20 min read

2.R Review and references

In this lesson you will:

  • Recap the main points of Module 2
  • Test yourself on six review questions
  • Find the sources cited in this module

This page closes Module 2, STRIDE and Other Methodologies. Citation numbers in square brackets in the sections refer to the reference list at the end of this page.

Module summary

  • STRIDE (Microsoft, 1999) finds threats by category: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege. Each violates authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, confidentiality, availability or authorisation.
  • STRIDE-per-element: external entities S, R; processes all six; data stores T, I, D (and R when they hold logs); data flows T, I, D. STRIDE-per-interaction analyses each boundary-crossing flow with its sender and receiver.
  • Write specific threat statements, record existing controls, and do not argue about classification.
  • Rate threats with an agreed likelihood × impact scale in business terms. DREAD is subjective and rewards obscurity; CVSS scores confirmed vulnerabilities, not design-time business risk.
  • Each STRIDE category has standard mitigation patterns; threat libraries (CAPEC, ATT&CK, CWE, OWASP) check coverage.
  • PASTA is a seven-stage, risk-centric method linking threats to business objectives; heavy but board-friendly.
  • LINDDUN finds privacy threats (linking, identifying, non-repudiation, detecting, data disclosure, unawareness, non-compliance) that occur even without an attacker.
  • Attack trees analyse one attacker goal with OR and AND nodes; annotate leaves to find the cheapest path.
  • OCTAVE is organisation-centric; Trike, VAST, hTMM, persona non grata, kill chains and card games each have their place. Combine methods to answer the question in front of you.

Review questions

1. Which security property does a repudiation threat violate?

  • A. Integrity
  • B. Non-repudiation
  • C. Authentication
  • D. Confidentiality

2. Using STRIDE-per-element, which categories apply to an external entity?

  • A. Tampering and information disclosure
  • B. Spoofing and repudiation
  • C. All six categories
  • D. Denial of service and elevation of privilege

3. A "viewer" role can approve refunds because the approve button is hidden in the UI but the API does not check the role. Which category BEST fits?

  • A. Spoofing
  • B. Information disclosure
  • C. Elevation of privilege
  • D. Denial of service

4. Why is DREAD's "discoverability" factor criticised?

  • A. It double-counts the number of affected users
  • B. It rewards obscurity, lowering scores for threats defenders assume are hidden
  • C. It cannot be scored without a running system
  • D. It ignores the financial impact of a threat

5. A product team wants to know how a new loyalty feature might profile customers through normal use. Which method should they add to STRIDE?

  • A. PASTA
  • B. OCTAVE
  • C. LINDDUN
  • D. CVSS

6. In an attack tree, what is the effect of adding a control that turns an OR node into an AND node?

  • A. The attacker can now choose either path, so risk rises
  • B. The attacker must now succeed at every child, raising the cost of the goal
  • C. The tree no longer needs leaf annotations
  • D. The goal is removed from the tree
Show answers
  1. B. Repudiation means an actor can deny an action because the system cannot prove it.
  2. B. Something can impersonate an external entity, and an external entity can deny an action. You do not model threats inside it.
  3. C. The user gains a capability they were not granted. Server-side authorisation is the control.
  4. B. Attackers often find what defenders thought was hidden; scoring by discoverability encourages security through obscurity.
  5. C. LINDDUN covers linking and identifying threats that occur through normal processing.
  6. B. With an AND node the attacker needs all children, which raises cost and time.

References

  1. Kohnfelder, L. and Garg, P. The threats to our products. Microsoft, 1999.
  2. Shostack, A. Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. Wiley, 2014 (Chapter 3, STRIDE; STRIDE-per-element and per-interaction).
  3. Shostack, A. "Experiences Threat Modeling at Microsoft". Modeling Security Workshop, 2008.
  4. FIRST. Common Vulnerability Scoring System version 4.0: Specification Document. 2023. https://www.first.org/cvss/
  5. OWASP Foundation. OWASP Risk Rating Methodology. https://owasp.org/www-community/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology
  6. MITRE. CAPEC: Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification. https://capec.mitre.org/
  7. MITRE. ATT&CK. https://attack.mitre.org/
  8. UcedaVélez, T. and Morana, M. Risk Centric Threat Modeling: Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis. Wiley, 2015.
  9. Wuyts, K., Sion, L. and Joosen, W. LINDDUN: privacy threat modeling. KU Leuven DistriNet. https://linddun.org/
  10. Schneier, B. "Attack Trees". Dr. Dobb's Journal, December 1999.
  11. Caralli, R. et al. Introducing OCTAVE Allegro. CMU/SEI-2007-TR-012, Software Engineering Institute, 2007.