Conducting, Sharing and Remediating, 20 min read

5.R Review and references

In this lesson you will:

  • Recap the main points of Module 5
  • Test yourself on six review questions
  • Find the sources cited in this module

This page closes Module 5, Conducting, Sharing and Remediating. Citation numbers in square brackets in the sections refer to the reference list at the end of this page.

Module summary

  • Prepare every session: scope statement, draft DFD, five to eight people in defined roles (facilitator, scribe, architect, developers, tester, product owner, specialists), short pre-read.
  • Run a timeboxed agenda: open, model, find threats boundary by boundary, rate and assign owners, close; send the record within 24 hours.
  • Get everyone contributing with silent brainstorming, round robins, personas, cards and assume-breach prompts. Park deep dives; protect the time for decisions.
  • For AI systems, add ML and data engineers and owners of systems an agent can change; prepare the lifecycle view, untrusted-content entry points and the tool and permission table.
  • Write threats as actor, prerequisites, action, impact and asset. Strong statements are faster to act on.
  • A usable report has an executive summary, scope and assumptions, system model, threat register, mitigations and owners, and residual risk with acceptance.
  • Tailor findings by audience; communicate in business terms, credit existing controls, avoid blame, rate honestly; treat threat models as sensitive.
  • Respond by mitigating, eliminating, transferring or accepting; ask whether you can eliminate first. Combine prevent, detect and respond in depth, enforced on the server.
  • Ticket mitigations with owners, SLAs and tests; accept risks formally with expiry; verify by testing the threat itself; feed results back into the model.

Review questions

1. What is the MAIN benefit of sending a draft DFD before the session?

  • A. It removes the need for an architect to attend
  • B. It saves session time and turns the modelling step into correction rather than a lecture
  • C. It allows the threats to be found before the session
  • D. It satisfies the requirement for a pre-read under OWASP SAMM

2. Which technique BEST draws contributions from quieter team members?

  • A. Letting the most senior engineer lead discussion
  • B. Silent brainstorming before open discussion
  • C. Extending the session to three hours
  • D. Rating threats before finding them

3. Which is the strongest threat statement?

  • A. "Broken access control on reports."
  • B. "Critical: IDOR (CWE-639)."
  • C. "A logged-in merchant user can download another merchant's settlement report by changing the report ID in the URL, exposing payout and customer data."
  • D. "Reports might be accessible to the wrong people in some cases."

4. A board member asks about the threat model. What should you lead with?

  • A. The STRIDE category counts
  • B. The top risks in business terms and the decisions needed
  • C. The full threat register
  • D. The DFD at Level 2

5. Which response removes the capability that creates a threat?

  • A. Mitigate
  • B. Eliminate
  • C. Transfer
  • D. Accept

6. When can a threat's status move to "verified"?

  • A. When the developer closes the ticket
  • B. When the product owner accepts the sprint
  • C. When there is evidence, such as a passing test, that the threat itself is blocked
  • D. When the threat model is next reviewed
Show answers
  1. B. A draft avoids the opening lecture and lets the session focus on correcting the model and finding threats.
  2. B. Writing before speaking stops the loudest voices setting the agenda.
  3. C. It names the actor, prerequisite, action, impact and asset.
  4. B. Executives need business exposure and decisions, not method detail.
  5. B. Elimination removes the feature, data or capability.
  6. C. Verification requires evidence that the mitigation works against the threat, tested from the attacker's side.

References

  1. Amazon Web Services. Threat Composer (threat statement grammar). https://github.com/awslabs/threat-composer
  2. Shostack, A. Threat Modeling: Designing for Security. Wiley, 2014 (Part IV, Threat modeling in technology and tricky areas; Chapter 17, Bringing threat modeling to your organization).
  3. Microsoft. Elevation of Privilege threat modeling card game.
  4. OWASP Foundation. Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.html
  5. ISO. ISO 31000:2018 Risk management — Guidelines (risk treatment options).
  6. Tarandach, I. and Coles, M. Threat Modeling: A Practical Guide for Development Teams. O'Reilly, 2020.