Ready reckoner
Definition and the four questions
Threat modelling = analysing a representation of a system to find security and privacy concerns, and deciding what to do about them, before they become incidents.
| # | Question | Typical output |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | What are we working on? | DFD, assets, entry points, assumptions, scope |
| 2 | What can go wrong? | Threat list (STRIDE, libraries, attack trees) |
| 3 | What are we going to do about it? | Mitigate / eliminate / transfer / accept, owners, tickets |
| 4 | Did we do a good enough job? | Tests, pen test focus, review, retrospective |
Vocabulary
| Term | Means | Kestrel example |
|---|---|---|
| Asset | Something of value | Merchant settlements |
| Threat actor | Who/what causes harm | Fraudster, insider, bot |
| Threat | What could go wrong | Redirect another merchant's payout |
| Vulnerability | Weakness that enables it | No ownership check (IDOR) |
| Risk | Likelihood × impact | Likely; ₹ crore + regulator report |
| Control | Reduces risk | Server-side ownership check, step-up OTP |
Grammar: threats = attacker's view ("an attacker can…"); vulnerabilities = system ("the API does not…"); controls = action ("the API will…").
Why design time
- Design flaws (missing authZ, wrong trust assumption, unneeded feature) cannot be patched in one line.
- Scanners cannot see business rules → broken access control stays #1 in the OWASP Top 10.
- Threat models tell pen testers where to look; pen-test misses feed back into the model.
Manifesto (2020)
Values: culture > checkbox · people > tools · journey > snapshot · doing > talking · continuous refinement > single delivery. Anti-patterns: hero threat modeller, admiration for the problem, perfect representation, tendency to overfocus.
Data flow diagrams
| Element | Shape | Remember |
|---|---|---|
| External entity | Rectangle | Outside your control; threats from it |
| Process | Circle | Makes decisions; all STRIDE categories apply |
| Data store | Parallel lines | DB, file, queue, log, vector DB, memory |
| Data flow | Arrow | Label data + protocol; must start or end at a process |
| Trust boundary | Dashed line | Where trust changes → analyse every crossing |
- Level 0 = context; Level 1 = working level; Level 2+ only where risk justifies.
- Zoom in when a box hides a boundary or a security decision; split at ~20 elements.
- Record assets, entry points, dated assumptions; scope includes downstream use of the data.
- AI preview: mark where untrusted content enters a model's context window (instructions and data mix).