Secure AI Operations and Incident Response, 10 min read

Ready reckoner

Readiness

  • Lifecycle unchanged: prepare → detect/analyze → contain → eradicate → recover → learn. Contents change.
  • RACI across SOC, MLOps, model owner, data owner, privacy, legal, comms.
  • Release requirements include two-sided baselines (override rate too high or too low is a signal).
  • Prompts, guardrail rules and tool definitions as configuration as code, pinned, with drift detection.

Telemetry

Layer Must log
Gateway Identity, prompt (masked/hashed), tokens, filter verdicts
Agent Plan, steps, tool chosen, approvals, on-behalf-of identity
Retrieval Query, chunk IDs/sources, permission-check result
Model Exact version, settings, prompt version, output
Tools Tool, parameters, result, credential used
  • Join by trace ID; sync clocks; send to SIEM; SOAR for reversible first responses.
  • Logs as evidence: separate store, immutable, hashed, gap monitoring, chain of custody.
  • Privacy tiers: metadata (broad) · masked content with consistent tokenization (analysts) · full content (break-glass).

Detection

  • Points: inputs, retrieval, outputs, tools, resource use. Layer signatures + classifiers + anomaly detection; tune on misses and false alarms.
  • Canary tokens in prompts/documents → extraction detected.
  • Access misuse (wrong identity) → revoke credential. Agency misuse (right agent, wrong action, often after untrusted content) → pause agent, quarantine content.
  • Exposed secret → revoke and rotate first, then trace spread.
  • UEBA with per-agent baselines; SOC AI protected from injection via logs it reads.

Vulnerability posture

  • Registers: vulnerability + exposure. Many AI weaknesses have no CVE, no patch.
  • Verified closed = many attempts and variants vs a criterion set in advance.
  • Prioritize by exposure, exploitation, data, privileges, existing controls, consequence; CVSS + KEV + EPSS for conventional flaws.
  • Legacy models: compensating controls, usage restrictions, time-limited exceptions with expiry.

Response

  • Taxonomy: injection, jailbreak, poisoning, extraction, leakage, agent misuse, supply chain, harmful output.
  • Involve legal and privacy early: CERT-In 6 h · NIS2 24 h · GDPR 72 h · AI Act serious incidents.
  • Containment ladder: tighten guardrails → throttle/block → reduce capability → isolate → roll back → kill switch. Least disruptive step that reliably stops harm.
  • Stop agents: revoke credentials → hold pending actions → record state → stop.
  • Evidence in order of volatility; snapshot before cleaning.

Investigation and eradication

  • Kill chains: poisoning (trace with lineage) · indirect injection (trace with traces). ATLAS vocabulary.
  • Trace replay from logs, not re-runs. Artifact comparison, dataset diffing, isolated behavioral tests, unified timeline.
  • Eradicate data, models, derived models (fine-tunes, distillations, adapters), indexes, caches, agent memory, enabling weakness, attacker access.
  • Reintroduce via regression tests, red-team retest, verification, staged rollout.

Recovery

  • Verified trusted state: signed rollback, clean checkpoints, rebuild index (not piecemeal deletes), configs from version control.
  • Circuit breakers and kill switches act outside the model, fail safe, are tested.
  • BCP: dependency map, RTO/RPO, tested alternatives, degraded modes, tested restores.
  • Blameless reviews → tracked actions, TTP register, detections, playbooks, tests.
  • Data removal: unlearning (fast, approximate) · retraining (certain, costly) · termination.