Ransomware remains one of the most damaging threats organisations face. Modern attacks combine encryption of systems with theft of data for extortion, and they often start with something mundane: a stolen password, an unpatched VPN appliance, a phishing email. This checklist covers what makes the biggest difference, organised by prevent, detect and recover.
Prevent: close the common entry points
Identity
- Phishing-resistant MFA for remote access, email, cloud consoles and all administrators.
- No internet-exposed RDP or SSH without a VPN or zero-trust access layer.
- Separate admin accounts for privileged work, not used for email or browsing.
- Disable legacy authentication that bypasses MFA.
Edge and internet-facing systems
- An up-to-date inventory of everything exposed to the internet.
- Critical vulnerabilities on VPNs, firewalls, gateways and remote-access tools patched within days, not weeks. These have been a favourite entry point.
- End-of-life edge devices replaced.
Endpoints and email
- Endpoint detection and response (EDR) on all servers and workstations, with tamper protection.
- Macros from the internet blocked; email attachment and link filtering.
- Application allow-listing on servers where practical.
Reducing blast radius
- Network segmentation so one compromised workstation can't reach every server, especially backups and domain controllers.
- Tiered administration for identity systems (Active Directory, Entra ID).
- Local admin rights removed from users; unique local admin passwords (LAPS).
Detect: catch the attack before encryption
Attackers often spend days in a network before deploying ransomware: stealing credentials, moving laterally, disabling defences and copying data. Watch for:
- new admin accounts or group changes;
- disabling of security tools or backups;
- use of remote management tools not normally used in your environment;
- large outbound data transfers (exfiltration);
- mass file renames or modifications.
Make sure alerts reach someone at night and at weekends, the favourite times for deployment. A managed detection and response service can provide round-the-clock cover.
Recover: assume encryption will happen
Backups
- Follow 3-2-1-1-0: three copies, on two media types, one offsite, one immutable or offline, and zero errors in restore testing.
- Backups protected with separate credentials and MFA. Attackers target backup consoles first.
- Restore tests of critical systems on a schedule. Measure how long a full restore really takes.
- Include identity systems, configurations and SaaS data, not just file servers.
Plans
- An incident response plan with a ransomware playbook: who decides, who to call (incident response firm, legal counsel, insurer), and how to communicate if email and chat are down.
- Out-of-band communications, such as a separate messaging tool and printed contact lists.
- A business continuity plan: which processes must run manually, and for how long.
- A decision framework for extortion demands, prepared in advance with legal advice. Paying doesn't guarantee recovery or deletion of stolen data, and may be illegal if the attackers are sanctioned.
Regulatory reporting in India
- CERT-In: ransomware is a reportable incident, due within six hours of noticing it. See the six-hour rule.
- DPDP Act: if personal data is affected (encrypted, i.e. loss of availability, or stolen), notify the Data Protection Board and affected individuals, with a detailed report in 72 hours. See the breach playbook.
- Sector regulators such as RBI, SEBI and IRDAI have their own reporting requirements and timelines.
Rehearse
Run a ransomware tabletop exercise at least yearly, with executives, and a technical restore exercise. The first time you work through these decisions should not be during a real attack.
Learn more
Incident management, business continuity and security operations are covered in the free CISM and CISSP tracks.
Written and reviewed by the DigiTrust Asia editorial team. How we research, review and correct articles.