Almost every secure connection on the internet, from banking apps and VPNs to software updates and digital signatures, relies on public-key cryptography: mainly RSA and elliptic-curve algorithms. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break these. Nobody knows exactly when such a machine will exist, but governments and standards bodies have stopped waiting. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is the set of new algorithms designed to resist quantum attacks, and the migration to it has begun.

What quantum computers break, and what they don't

Cryptography Used for Quantum impact
RSA, Diffie–Hellman, elliptic curves (ECDH, ECDSA, EdDSA) Key exchange, digital signatures, certificates Broken by Shor's algorithm on a large enough quantum computer
Symmetric encryption (AES) Encrypting data Weakened by Grover's algorithm; AES-256 remains strong
Hash functions (SHA-2, SHA-3) Integrity, passwords, signatures Modestly weakened; current sizes remain adequate

So the problem is concentrated in public-key cryptography: how we agree on keys and how we prove identity and integrity. Your encrypted databases using AES-256 are not the main worry. The key exchanges and signatures around them are.

Why act before the quantum computer exists

Two reasons.

1. Harvest now, decrypt later. Adversaries can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once they have a quantum computer. Any data that must stay secret for many years, such as health records, state secrets, intellectual property and long-term financial data, is already exposed if it travels over quantum-vulnerable key exchange. See harvest now, decrypt later.

2. Migration takes years. Cryptography is embedded everywhere: protocols, libraries, hardware security modules, smart cards, IoT devices, certificates and partner integrations. Past migrations, such as moving off SHA-1 or older TLS versions, took a decade or more.

The new standards

In August 2024, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first three PQC standards after an eight-year international competition:

  • FIPS 203, ML-KEM (based on CRYSTALS-Kyber): key establishment, replacing RSA and ECDH key exchange.
  • FIPS 204, ML-DSA (based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium): general-purpose digital signatures.
  • FIPS 205, SLH-DSA (based on SPHINCS+): hash-based signatures, a conservative backup.

A fourth standard, FN-DSA (based on Falcon) for compact signatures, is in progress as FIPS 206. In March 2025 NIST selected HQC as a backup key-establishment algorithm based on different mathematics. See our field guide to the NIST standards.

The timelines regulators are setting

  • United States: NIST's draft transition guidance proposes deprecating quantum-vulnerable algorithms by 2030 and disallowing them by 2035. The NSA's CNSA 2.0 requires new national security system acquisitions to support quantum-resistant algorithms from 2027.
  • European Union: a coordinated roadmap asks member states to start transitioning by the end of 2026 and to protect high-risk use cases by 2030.
  • United Kingdom: the NCSC suggests discovery and planning by 2028, priority migrations by 2031, and completion by 2035.
  • India: a national task force report in February 2026 set out a phased, sector-by-sector roadmap, with critical sectors moving first. See India's quantum-safe roadmap.

What it means in practice

  • Hybrid first. Many deployments combine a classical algorithm with a post-quantum one, so security holds if either survives. Major browsers and content networks already use hybrid key exchange (X25519 with ML-KEM) for a large share of web traffic. See hybrid key exchange in TLS.
  • Bigger keys and signatures. PQC public keys, ciphertexts and signatures are much larger than their elliptic-curve equivalents. This matters for constrained devices, certificates and protocols with tight size limits.
  • Crypto-agility. Systems should be able to change algorithms without being rebuilt. See crypto-agility.

Five decisions for leaders

  1. Assign ownership. Someone must own the PQC programme, usually under the CISO, with architecture and procurement involved.
  2. Fund an inventory. You can't migrate what you can't find. Start a cryptographic inventory (a "cryptographic bill of materials") of systems, libraries, certificates and keys.
  3. Prioritise by data shelf life and exposure. Long-lived secrets and internet-facing key exchange come first.
  4. Change procurement now. Require vendors to publish PQC roadmaps and support the NIST standards. Stop buying new systems that can't be upgraded.
  5. Start with quick wins. Enable hybrid TLS where your platforms support it, and upgrade libraries and VPNs as vendors ship support.

Learn more

Read our post-quantum migration roadmap. For cryptography fundamentals, including symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hashing, PKI and key management, see the free CISSP track.

Written and reviewed by the DigiTrust Asia editorial team. How we research, review and correct articles.

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